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1. Introduction
Over the last 15 years or so there have been a num-
ber of calls for accounting reforms, with claims
that the traditional historical cost approach has
outlived its usefulness.1 One of the claims made in
these debates is that the economy has changed in
fundamental ways, that business is now funda-
mentally ‘knowledge-based’ rather than industrial,
and that ‘intangibles’ are the new drivers of eco-
nomic activity. Based on these claims, commenta-
tors contend that one of the key problems faced by
financial reporting is that financial statements fail
to recognise many of the most important knowl-
edge-based intangibles, such as intellectual capital,
and that this has adversely affected investments in
intangibles.2 This has led to calls for accounting
standard-setters to re-evaluate how intangibles are
accounted for, and to make reforms.
My goal in this paper is to synthesise and evalu-
ate the current set of policy proposals in this area.
My main objective is to provide a critical review
of the claims made by the various commentators in
this area to justify the need for reform as well as to
review the proposals themselves. I argue that the
case for reform is surprisingly weak, and does not
support claims that large-scale reforms are neces-
sary. More specifically, I argue that capital markets
actually function rather well in financing compa-
nies that engage in innovative, high-technology,
and knowledge-based activities. In addition, I argue
that an approach to intangibles that involves man-
dating more extensive disclosure in this area is
likely to be unsuccessful, but that there are market-
based incentives for companies to voluntarily pro-
vide these disclosures. Moreover, I argue that
proposals to modify the current accounting model
to recognise intangibles on the balance sheet are
flawed for a number of reasons.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the definition of intangibles and so lays out
the scope of my discussion. Section 3 then pres-
ents and analyses the case for reform, which I find
is rather weak. Section 4 then discusses and evalu-
ates proposals related to improving disclosure 
related to intangibles, while Section 5 discusses
and evaluates proposals related to recognition.
Section 6 concludes.
2. What exactly do we mean by 
‘intangibles’?
Before evaluating the various policy proposals, it
is important to clearly distinguish the different
terms used by commentators in this area and arrive
at a clear definition of intangibles. My review of
the extant literature indicates that the majority of
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1 For example, the Jenkins Report, a report from a commit-
tee formed by the AICPA in the United States in 1991 and
chaired by Edmund Jenkins, provided a number of recom-
mendations, such as (1) making financial reporting more for-
ward-looking, and (2) reporting business measures outside the
conventional financial reporting model, including product re-
ject rates, market shares, measures of customer satisfaction,
patents, and others. See DiPiazza et al. (2006) for a more re-
cent call for change in the financial reporting model.
2 For example, see Cañibano et al. (2000), Lev (2001),
Meritum (2001), and Nakamura (1999).
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the discussion on intangibles falls into two differ-
ent areas.3 First, the most sweeping proposals take
a broad view of intangibles, and include in this cat-
egory virtually any resource that is both intangible
(lacking physical substance) and of economic
value to the firm.4 This includes all types of intel-
lectual capital, including those items associated
with the firm’s human capital (the value of em-
ployee training, morale, loyalty, knowledge, etc.),
process-related capital (the value of intangibles as-
sociated with information technology, production
processes, etc.), and external relations (customer
satisfaction, customer loyalty, business relation-
ships, other components of brand values, etc.).
Second, mindful of the practical difficulties as-
sociated with such a wide-reaching definition, ac-
counting standard-setters are currently evaluating
accounting for a narrower set of items, most no-
tably by limiting discussion to those intangibles
that are ‘identifiable’ (i.e. items that have value on
a stand-alone basis) and meet conventional defini-
tions of assets.5 It appears that standard-setters are
most concerned, at least in the short-run, with
achieving better consistency in accounting for in-
tangibles. In particular, there are concerns about
the different treatment of intangibles acquired in
external transactions (which are usually recog-
nised as assets) and those that are internally devel-
oped (which are not).
Accounting standard-setters have also devoted a
great deal of attention to accounting for goodwill,
which is a topic that I leave aside because it is
largely separable from the discussion in many of
the proposals on intangibles accounting and be-
cause its recognition and measurement is related to
accounting for business combinations, which I see
as taking the discussion too far afield. I would note
though that a loose definition of goodwill – as the
excess of a business’ economic value over its book
value – is taken by commentators as evidence of
the failure of the current accounting model to cor-
rectly recognise intangibles, a view that I address
specifically below.
In this paper, I spend most time on proposals re-
lated to the broader definition of intangibles dis-
cussed above, although most of the points that I
make as part of my discussion are also relevant to
the narrower questions currently of interest to stan-
dard-setters.
3. The case for reform of accounting for
intangibles
This section examines the case for changing cur-
rent practice with respect to accounting for intan-
gibles. The case in favour of reform rests on
various claims about how the current accounting
system is deficient. In most cases, I do not find
these arguments very convincing and so am skep-
tical about the need for reform in this area. I dis-
cuss the various arguments in turn in Section 3.1
below. In particular, proponents of reform argue
that alleged deficiencies in the current accounting
model inhibit the ability of companies that rely on
intangibles from obtaining financing in capital
markets. Section 3.2 provides a counter to this ar-
gument, and suggests that markets actually work
rather well in financing all types of economic ac-
tivity, including innovative knowledge-based ac-
tivity.
3.1. Evaluating the case for reform
There are a number of arguments in favour of re-
forming current practice relating to accounting and
disclosure of intangibles. I summarise these argu-
ments in turn below, and provide an accompanying
evaluation of each argument.
1) The economy has changed in such a way that
conventional financial statements have become
less relevant.
This argument starts with the observation that
businesses are increasingly creating value through
knowledge-based resources that lack physical sub-
stance (i.e. intangibles). Those who make this ar-
gument sometimes also assert that the traditional
industrial model, in which businesses add value by
applying labour and capital to transform raw mate-
rial into finished products, is becoming increasing-
ly less important.6
This argument is undoubtedly true to some de-
gree. There is little doubt that technology compa-
nies such as Google, Microsoft, Samsung, Nokia,
and others play a more important role in the
world’s economy than was true as recently as 
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3 My goal in this paper is not to provide a comprehensive
review of the intangibles literature. There is a large volume of
literature, especially with respect to the disclosure of informa-
tion about intellectual capital, and especially in Europe, that I
do not reference. Instead, my goal is to discuss and evaluate
the principal policy recommendations with respect to account-
ing for intangibles.
4 For example, the Meritum Guidelines (p. 9) defines intan-
gibles as non-monetary sources of probable future economic
benefits that lack physical substance, are controlled as a result
of past transactions and events, and may or may not be sepa-
rable.
5 See the IASB Project Update ‘Intangible Assets’ (June
2007). GAAP typically requires that an asset possess three es-
sential characteristics (e.g. SFAC 6, para. 26): (i) it embodies
a future economic benefit (contributes directly or indirectly to
future net cash flows), (ii) a particular entity can obtain the
benefit and restrict others’ access to it, (iii) a particular trans-
action or event giving rise to the benefit or control has already
occurred. This statement specifically indicates that assets may
be intangible and that legal enforceability of a claim to a ben-
efit is not a prerequisite if the entity can obtain or control the
benefit in other ways. Notice that it is not clear that intangibles
like intellectual capital satisfy this definition if the entity can-
not fully control the associated benefits.
6 Lev (2001) advances the related argument that traditional
forms of economic activity, such as manufacturing, have be-
come increasingly commoditised.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:43
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
20 years ago, and that more traditional companies
are also increasingly relying on knowledge-based
assets to generate value. I take issue, however,
with the related implication that this growth occurs
as a result of a substitution of resources away from
more ‘traditional’ industries. The economic for-
tunes of most industries are to some degree cycli-
cal; thus, while internet and telecom stocks were in
vogue in the late 1990s, helping to fuel the growth
of the ‘New Economy’, over the last several years
we have seen a resurgence in more traditional in-
dustries, such as oil and gas, mining, commodities,
and steel, largely due to booming demand for in-
dustrial output in emerging markets such as China.
So I think the case that these traditional industries
are passé is overstated.
Of more relevance to the accounting proposals,
however, is the claim that the emergence of tech-
nology companies (i.e. those whose value is com-
prised of significant amounts of intangibles)
naturally implies that that the conventional ac-
counting model is broken. Several arguments are
offered as evidence in support of this claim, all of
which I believe are largely flawed.
2) Financial statements are less relevant than
they were in the past.
A number of research papers investigate the
claim that financial statement variables are now
less relevant in the sense that financial statement
numbers are less closely related to security prices.
While some papers claim to find support for this
statement, others claim to find the opposite, in-
cluding papers that specifically examine technolo-
gy companies.7 The fact that conclusions differ
across studies is due in part to the use of different
methodologies, which is due in turn to the fact that
there is controversy in this area about the appro-
priate econometric methods. In addition, some of
these studies use samples that end in the early to
mid-1990s, before the rise of the New Economy.
Thus it is interesting to consider a more recent
study by Core et al. (2003), who specifically in-
vestigate whether there was a change in the rela-
tion between stock prices and financial variables
during the ‘New Economy Period’, which they de-
fine as the late 1990s. They find that stock market
values are both higher and more volatile during this
period, that the relation between these values and
financial statement variables remains stable during
this period compared with preceding periods, but
that the explanatory power of these financial state-
ment variables declines during this period.8 Thus,
while there is no decline in the usefulness of tradi-
tional financial statement variables, those vari-
ables explain a lower fraction of the variation in
stock values during this period. It would be inter-
esting to extend this research to the period after
2000–2001, after what is now viewed as a ‘bubble’
in the prices of high-technology companies had
burst. It is possible that the decline in explanatory
power Core et al. observe is due to ‘irrationally ex-
uberant’ stock prices during the late 1990s.9
3) The existing accounting model simply fails to
recognise many knowledge-based intangibles.
This argument is certainly correct – in many
cases, internally developed intangibles, such as
brand names, customer relationships, employee
morale and training, etc., fail to satisfy asset recog-
nition criteria under current GAAP rules, whether
IFRS or US GAAP. However, although this state-
ment is correct, it does not follow that there is a
problem with the accounting model. Proponents of
reforming accounting for intangibles infer directly
from the fact that many economically valuable in-
tangibles are not recognised in the balance sheet
that there is a problem with the accounting. For ex-
ample, some claim that the failure to recognise
such intangibles means that investors will system-
atically undervalue companies whose value is
largely dependent on knowledge and technology,
and consequently that these companies will have
difficulty raising capital. For example, see Lev
(2001) and the Meritum Guidelines.
This argument does not make sense to me. As
discussed further below, under current accounting
conventions the balance sheet is not designed to
form the basis for valuation. Rather, most ap-
proaches to equity valuation rely on information
from the income statement, and use that informa-
tion to forecast future revenues, earnings, and cash
flows. As Penman (2007) demonstrates, this ap-
proach works well to value companies, even those
for which relatively large amounts of value are at-
tributable to intangibles.
Moreover, as far as I can tell, proponents of this
view do not offer any convincing evidence to sup-
port the claim that technology companies are
handicapped in their ability to raise equity capital.
In fact, many technology companies (for example,
Google and Cisco) are valued relatively highly by
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 193
7 See, for example, Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999), Chang
(1998), Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997), Francis and
Schipper (1999), and Lev and Zarowin (1999). Collins et al.
(1997), and Francis and Schipper (1999) both report evidence
that the overall value relevance of earnings and book values
has remained stable over time, while Chang (1998), Brown et
al. (1999), and Lev and Zarowin (1999) report a decline in
overall value relevance.
8 Their results are consistent across different subsamples of
firms, including young technology companies.
9 Penman (2003) argues that an important role of the tradi-
tional financial reporting model is to serve as an anchor dur-
ing bubbles ‘to check speculative beliefs’. Under this view we
expect exactly those results that Core et al. (2003) obtain – the
fact that the traditional financial statement variables do not ex-
plain equity values very well during this period indicates that
those equity values were out-of-line with fundamentals, rather
than suggesting some kind of deficiency in financial reporting.
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investors and seem to have had little trouble rais-
ing capital. Google currently has market value in
excess of $220bn,10 an amount that is well over 10
times its current book value (of $17bn). It is hard
to argue that Google has had difficulty raising eq-
uity capital, or that it issues shares on un-
favourable terms.
This argument is supported by academic evi-
dence. Fama and French (2004) find that the set of
firms that obtain stock market financing expanded
tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s – there was
almost a fourfold increase in the number of firms
going public on US stock exchanges between 1980
and 2001. Moreover, firms that go public are in-
creasingly less profitable, with higher growth and
lower survival rates than was the case before 1980.
This is consistent with my assertion that less prof-
itable ‘growth’ stocks that tend to be riskier have
been increasingly successful in accessing public
equity markets. This evidence runs counter to what
those advocating reform would have us believe.
A related version of this argument points to the
‘large’ and increasing difference between book
values and market values of certain companies as
evidence that there is a problem with the book value
number, in that it is ‘missing’ the value of intangi-
bles.11 Under this argument, commentators are es-
sentially arguing that in an ideal world accounting
book values would be set equal to the firm’s mar-
ket value. Even if we assume that the gap between
market and book values is solely due to the value
of unrecognised intangibles,12 a close examination
of this argument reveals that it misapprehends the
role of financial statements, whether one takes a
stewardship (contracting) perspective or a valua-
tion (investor) perspective on accounting.
The basic premise of the stewardship model of
financial reporting is that financial statements pro-
vide information useful for contracting among the
various parties to the firm. It follows from this per-
spective that reliability of balance sheet measure-
ments is of paramount importance, which explains
the prominent role of external transactions as a
means of validating the existence and amount of
transactions. This approach, which is fundamental
to our current accounting model and has long-run
survival value, precludes the recognition of items
that do not result from external transactions and
events and/or for which measurement is costly to
verify. Consequently, our current model precludes
the recognition of internally developed intangibles
because the future benefits of these expenditures
are inherently uncertain and very difficult for ex-
ternal auditors to verify.13
Consider the use of accounting in lending agree-
ments. The asymmetric nature of lenders’ claims
on firms’ assets is such that they are generally only
willing to lend to the firm to the extent that it has
tangible assets because these assets typically retain
much of their value in the event of bankruptcy/liq-
uidation. Conversely, the excess of firm value over
book value often disappears once the firm ceases
to be a going concern. This occurs because this ex-
cess often represents the value of intangibles
whose value is intrinsically linked to the firm 
itself, and do not have value once the firm is no
longer a going concern.14
Even if one rejects the stewardship perspective
on accounting and adopts instead what we might
call an investor (or valuation) perspective, under
which the primary role of accounting is to provide
information useful to investors in valuing the com-
pany, it is still not the case that we would want
book value to track the company’s market value.
As Penman (2007) points out, valuation relies on
information provided by the income statement
rather than the balance sheet. He uses Coca-Cola
as an example, and points out that Coke has a mar-
194 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
10 November 2007.
11 For example, see DiPiazza (2006: 16): ‘The large dis-
crepancies between the ‘book’ and ‘market’ values of many, if
not most, public companies … provide strong evidence of the
limited usefulness of statements of assets and liabilities that
are based on historical costs.’ This argument became prevalent
during the late 1990s when stock prices increased dramatical-
ly, especially for technology stocks, so that the gap between
book and market values became especially large. Notice that
the argument ignores other possible explanations for increas-
ing market-to-book values; for example, certain changes in
GAAP rules (such as the recognition of pension and other
post-employment benefit obligations) may have lowered book
values.
12 It is not. Perhaps most obviously, market values capitalise
investors’ expectations about the firm’s future growth oppor-
tunities while book values do not. To the extent that public eq-
uity markets now contain a larger fraction of young ‘growth’
companies than was the case (say) 20 years ago (Fama and
French, 2004), we expect that market-to-book ratios will in-
crease over time. See Rowchowdhury and Watts (2007) for a
more complete discussion of market-to-book ratios.
13 The future benefits associated with intangibles such as
R&D are typically more uncertain than those associated with
most assets currently recognised under GAAP. For evidence
on this, see Kothari et al. (2002) or Shi (2003).
14 See Holthausen and Watts (2001) for further discussion of
this point. Consider also Alan Greenspan’s testimony to
Congress in February of 2002 about the failure of Enron: ‘As
the recent events surrounding Enron have highlighted, a firm
is inherently fragile if its value added emanates more from
conceptual as distinct from physical assets. A physical asset,
whether an office building or an automotive assembly plant,
has the capability of producing goods even if the reputation of
the managers of such facilities falls under a cloud. The rapid-
ity of Enron’s decline is an effective illustration of the vulner-
ability of a firm whose market value largely rests on
capitalised reputation. The physical assets of such a firm com-
prise a small portion of its asset base. Trust and reputation can
vanish overnight. A factory cannot.’ (Quote taken from Lev
(2002)). A front page Wall Street Journal article from April
2002 makes the interesting point that because value is now in-
creasingly derived from intangibles, companies are now much
more vulnerable to sudden declines in value, which shortens
their life spans. See ‘The Rise and Fall of Intangible Assets
Leads to Shorter Company Life Spans,’The Wall Street Journal,
4 April, 2002, p. 1.
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ket/book ratio in excess of six, a difference that he
attributes to the fact that the value of the Coca-
Cola brand name is ‘missing’ from the company’s
balance sheet. Nevertheless, he goes on to show
that Coke can be valued relatively easily and accu-
rately using conventional historical cost financial
statements.15
Penman also points out that in a world under
which accounting book values track market val-
ues, investors would lose much valuable informa-
tion about both the historical costs of firm assets
and the performance of management in transform-
ing those assets into revenues. In other words, the
traditional income statement provides investors
with information about how well management per-
forms selling goods and services above cost. Such
information would be lost under a model in which
book value tracked market value since the income
statement would then record unrealised gains and
losses on the firm’s portfolio of assets and liabili-
ties, so that analysts would lose much of the infor-
mation on which fundamental analysis is based.
4) Misallocation of resources argument
Some commentators argue that firms with large
amounts of intangibles relative to fixed, tangible
assets are handicapped in their ability to obtain fi-
nancing.16 Some rely on this assertion to claim
more broadly that innovation in the economy is sti-
fled by the inability of firms that rely on knowl-
edge-based assets to fund the research and other
activities necessary for innovation to continue.17
Once again, little evidence is offered in support of
this claim and, indeed, both economic logic and
casual empiricism suggest otherwise.
Perhaps the most fully exposited version of this
line of reasoning is made by Lev (2001), who
makes a number of arguments to support the claim
that the current lack of disclosure about intangibles
has adverse effects on capital markets. I do not
find any of these arguments very convincing.
First, Lev argues that firms with large amounts
of intangibles have a higher cost of capital, and
cites research by Boone and Raman (2001) in sup-
port of this claim. These authors find that firms
with relatively large amounts of R&D ‘assets’
(which they estimate using these firms’ past R&D
expenditures) have relatively higher bid-ask
spreads, a common proxy for equity market liq-
uidity. However, the authors fail to show that this
result is attributable to deficiencies in these firms’
disclosures or accounting, as opposed to simply re-
flecting the fact that these firms are economically
different from firms whose value comprises main-
ly more tangible assets. As discussed further
below, firms with relatively more ‘growth options’
are inherently riskier than other firms and natural-
ly have larger information asymmetries, which
leads to a less liquid market for their shares and to
a higher cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson,
1986). In other words, these results simply reflect
the fact that investors, as we would expect, believe
that expenditures on intangibles are riskier than
other investments. There is nothing surprising here
– indeed, this is precisely why the current ac-
counting model does not recognise these expendi-
tures as assets.
Second, Lev argues that current accounting prac-
tice leads to the ‘systematic undervaluation of in-
tangibles’ by investors. He points to two papers,
both of which apparently show that shares of firms
with relatively more R&D spending tend to out-
perform other firms in the years following that
spending.18 The implication is that these firms
were previously undervalued by market partici-
pants. I also find this evidence unconvincing. To
begin with, studies that cumulate measured abnor-
mal returns after an event date are notoriously 
difficult to interpret given vagaries in the measure-
ment of expected returns – in other words, it is
hard to know for sure that these were in fact ab-
normal returns and that there was undervaluation.
For example, it may be that the market correctly
discounted these firms’ expected cash flows be-
cause R&D projects are inherently riskier, and that
the researchers’ expected returns model underesti-
mated this risk.
Moreover, even if we agree that these firms are
undervalued, an important premise of this argu-
ment is that the market fails to correctly value
R&D expenditures at the time they are made be-
cause those expenditures are expensed rather than
capitalised at that time. Thus, it assumes that mar-
ket participants naïvely respond to the accounting
treatment of expenditures, and fail to understand
that R&D expenditures that are not capitalised
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 195
15 One could argue that if it is possible to value a company
without intangibles on the balance sheet, it is also possible to
value a company without tangibles on the balance sheet. This
observation is correct but reflects a misunderstanding about
the economic role of the balance sheet. The balance sheet’s
primary function is in stewardship/contracting rather than in
valuation. It is clear that even for entities whose value is pri-
marily dependent on tangible assets, the balance sheet will not
necessarily be very useful for valuation, for example, because
of the historical cost convention.
16 See, for example, Lev and Zarowin (1999: 383): ‘… the
reporting inadequacies documented above may adversely 
affect investors’ and firms’ welfare …’. Also see Meritum
Guidelines (p. 1): ‘… may result in significant economic loss-
es both for firms and their suppliers of goods, services, or cap-
ital…’ or Cañibano et al. (2000: 112): ‘If financial statements
provide investors with biased (conservative) estimates of the
firm’s value (book value of equity) … inefficiencies (myopia)
may appear in the resource allocation process …’.
17 Wallman (1995: 89) writes that ‘We cannot have financial
reporting and disclosure constraints that slow the pace of
progress in capital markets, decrease the rate of reduction in
the cost of capital, or limit innovation…’. There is little or no
evidence to support any of these claims.
18 The papers are Chan et al. (2001) and Lev et al. (2005).
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may well result in future benefits. In other words,
it assumes a surprising lack of sophistication on
the part of market participants, a view that I do not
find plausible. As indicated above, the very fact
that many technology firms trade at a large premi-
um to their book values would seem to contradict
the notion that investors mechanically rely on ac-
counting asset recognition rules in assessing equi-
ty values.19
Third, Lev argues that managers of firms in
R&D intensive firms make larger abnormal returns
from insider trading than managers of other firms
(Aboody and Lev, 2001). While this result is like-
ly correct and would imply a higher cost of capital
for these firms, this does not indicate a problem in
the accounting; it is a problem related to the en-
forcement of the securities laws and, more funda-
mentally, reflects these firms’ larger information
asymmetries. Consequently, it is not at all clear
that a different accounting or disclosure regime
would change this result.20
In sum, there is some evidence that the market
values firms whose value is principally composed
of intangibles differently from other firms (although
note that the evidence on this is largely limited to
firms with high levels of R&D expenditures).
However, this result does not necessarily say any-
thing about the desirability of particular account-
ing/disclosure treatments. Instead, it simply reflects
the fact that these firms have different economic
characteristics from other firms (they’re riskier,
with larger information asymmetries) rather than
any problems with their accounting or disclosure.
There is no evidence that the accounting or disclo-
sure treatment of intangibles in and of itself results
in systematically lower valuations for these firms.
3.2. There is evidence that capital markets work
well in providing different forms of financing to
companies with different economic attributes.
It is well-known in corporate finance that the na-
ture of firms’ investment opportunities affects their
financing. Myers (1977) distinguishes what he la-
bels ‘assets-in-place’ (assets in which the firm has
already invested) from ‘growth options’ (invest-
ment opportunities over which the firm has an op-
tion to proceed). He shows (and there is evidence
to support this view) that information asymmetries
between managers and those outside the firm are
significantly larger for firms whose value largely
comprises growth options. These information
asymmetries make it difficult for these firms to
borrow against their assets, because lenders cannot
be sure that managers of these firms will not op-
portunistically alter their investment strategies
once lending is in place.21 Consequently, these
firms typically have little debt and obtain financ-
ing principally from the equity markets. Notice
that Myers’ distinction between assets-in-place
and growth options corresponds quite well to the
distinction between those assets conventionally
recognised on the balance sheet and off-balance
sheet intangibles.22 Thus, the nature of firms’ fi-
nancing choices adjusts to the economic nature of
their investment opportunities, including intangi-
bles.
The point here is that markets function rather
well at financing activities that generate value
(more formally, that have positive NPV). Over the
last 15–20 years, we have seen the rise of many
prominent technology companies – Microsoft,
Intel, Cisco, Dell, and now Google – whose eco-
nomic value is largely attributable to some form of
economic intangible that is not reflected on their
balance sheets. The growth and success of these
companies is testament to the fact that markets
work well in providing financing to firms that cre-
ate value.23
196 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
19 See Pastor and Veronesi (2003) for an economic explana-
tion of why market-to-book ratios are relatively high for
younger firms and gradually decline over time. The basic in-
tuition is that investors learn over time about firm profitabili-
ty, and that high initial market-to-book values are rational and
attributable to investor uncertainty.
20 Notice also that these managers’ opportunistic insider
trading is an example of agency problems between managers
and shareholders. As has been well-known since Jensen and
Meckling (1976), market forces are very good at addressing
such problems. For example, if insider trading is costly to
stockholders because it reduces market liquidity and increases
the firm’s cost of capital, the firm is likely to endogenously
generate mechanisms that limit such behaviour.
21 For example, once managers have obtained debt financ-
ing, they could switch to higher risk investment opportunities
than those discussed with lenders, reducing the value of
lenders’ claims. Because lenders would rationally anticipate
this opportunistic behavior, they would charge the firm an ex-
cessive interest rate on the debt. Because managers of firms
whose value primarily comprises growth options cannot, at
reasonable cost, credibly commit to lenders that they will not
take such opportunistic actions, these firms typically avoid
debt financing (although lenders could potentially address
such opportunism ex ante by including debt covenants to pre-
vent such risk shifting, the large information asymmetries in-
herent in these firms’ businesses mean that writing and
enforcing such contractual solutions is likely to be prohibi-
tively expensive). Thus, it is not surprising that technology
firms whose value largely comprises these growth options
tend to have little or no long-term debt. For evidence, see
Smith and Watts (1992).
22 Other characteristics of many intangibles reinforce the
idea that they are unlikely to be financed by debt. For exam-
ple, many intangibles are characterised by difficult-to-enforce
property rights issues – it is hard to prevent others from ap-
propriating and enjoying the benefits associated with intangi-
bles; employees may leave the firm, taking valuable
intellectual capital with them, etc. In addition, it is less likely
that secondary markets exist for many intangibles, making in-
dependent assessments of value difficult to obtain.
23 As discussed above, large sample empirical evidence is
consistent with this view (Fama and French, 2004). Notice
that the nature of these firms’ investment opportunities also
explains their reliance on stock-based compensation, such as
employee stock options, rather than cash compensation (e.g.
Smith and Watts, 1992).
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Indeed, the growth of the venture capital indus-
try to finance high-tech start-ups in Silicon Valley
can be explained in terms of Myers’ theory. In
venture capital transactions, early-stage entities –
especially those in the bio-tech, telecom, and
computer-related industries – have serious infor-
mation asymmetry problems because of the 
uncertainty inherent in their investment opportu-
nities. The rise of the venture-capital formation
process – in which private investors take large eq-
uity positions in new companies – addresses these
problems. For example, the large equity positions
that investors take in these entities means that
these investors play an active role in managing
their operations and investments, mitigating infor-
mation asymmetries in a way that is not possible
with publicly traded equity.24 Once these crucial
early investments are in place and generating 
revenues, successful start-ups can then be taken
public.
As another example of how markets work well
to finance investments in intangibles, consider the
growing market for intellectual property securiti-
sations (‘IP securitisations’). Like all securitisa-
tions, these are financing transactions under which
an asset’s claim to future cash flows is used to col-
lateralise the issuance of debt securities. In this
case, the asset is some type of enforceable legal
right, such as patents, copyrights, or trademarks.
These transactions are being used to finance a
large array of intangibles, some prominent exam-
ples being:25
• The 1997 issuance of bonds collateralised by the
future sales of David Bowie’s music catalogue
(‘Bowie Bonds’).
• A US$1.7bn financing by Dunkin’ Brands
backed by an array of assets that included claims
to future royalties the company will receive from
franchisees.
• A US$210m financing by Paramount backed by
royalties from films that it had not yet made.
• A US$1.4bn financing based on the future li-
censing revenues from a portfolio of Formula 1
Grand Prix contracts.
Notice that these are cases for which the future
benefits associated with the underlying intangible
are inherently more uncertain than those associat-
ed with tangible assets such as factories and equip-
ment, which are the types of assets more typically
financed by debt.
To provide some evidence on whether spending
on intangibles has been inhibited by its accounting
treatment, I gathered data from Compustat on
three different types of expenditures made by US
publicly traded firms over the period 1980–2005.
As a proxy for intangibles expenditures, I gathered
data on both R&D and advertising expenditures.
To provide a benchmark for these expenditures, I
also gathered data on capital expenditures (under
US GAAP, capital expenditures are capitalised
while most R&D and advertising expenditures are
expensed as incurred). The data, after adjusting for
inflation and standardising to an index of 100 in
1980, are shown in Figure 1 (overleaf).
The data in Figure 1 show a rather striking pic-
ture. Over the period since 1980, aggregate capital
expenditures have grown rather modestly, by a bit
less than 50% overall. In contrast, spending on in-
tangibles has grown considerably. Aggregate R&D
spending increases steadily over this period, and is
250% higher in 2005 than it was in 1980. This is
striking evidence both that R&D spending is now
relatively more important in the economy and that
its accounting treatment has not obviously ad-
versely affected its growth. Of course, proponents
of the view that the conservative accounting treat-
ment of R&D has hindered R&D spending could
argue that this growth would have been even high-
er had R&D expenditures been capitalised.
However, the fact that aggregate R&D spending
has grown at a rate that is five times as large as
capital expenditures tells us, at a minimum, that a
good amount of R&D growth has occurred in spite
of this alleged accounting handicap.
Advertising expenditures have also grown more
strongly than capital expenditures, although the
difference is not as strong as that for R&D.
Advertising spending has grown by around 125%
over the period from 1980 to 2005, which is near-
ly three times the 44% rate of growth in capital ex-
penditures overall.
Overall, the point here is that financial markets
are remarkably adept at finding ways of financing
lots of different types of assets, including intangi-
bles, and including those for which traditional
means of financing (such as bank loans) are not
available. It is thus hard for me to believe that
companies have difficulty financing investments
in intangibles, as long as those investments ulti-
mately generate cash flow.
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24 Gompers (1995) provides evidence consistent with this
view. Specifically, he reports evidence that venture capitalists
are more likely to use ‘early stage’ financing in high technol-
ogy industries where information asymmetries are significant.
He also finds that early stage firms receive significantly less
money per round (‘staging’ is shorter) to allow more frequent
monitoring and that decreases in asset ‘tangibility’ decrease fi-
nancing duration and increase monitoring intensity. He meas-
ures asset tangibility using market-to-book ratios and R&D
intensities. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003: 19) also report evi-
dence that contracts used by venture capitalists are structured
to address the agency and information asymmetry problems
that are more prevalent in high-technology companies.
25 See ‘Intangible Opportunities: Securitising Intellectual
Property’. The Economist, 17 June 2006.
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4. Current proposals for the reform of 
accounting for intangibles
In this section I discuss several of the principal
proposals for reforming current accounting prac-
tice with respect to intangibles. Because these pro-
posals typically take a disclosure (as opposed to a
recognition) approach, I address the disclosure
issue first. I address proposals related to the recog-
nition of intangibles in Section 5.
Section 4.1 summarises a recent proposal from
the CEOs of the world’s six largest auditing firms;
Section 4.2 summarises two representative propos-
als from Europe/Scandinavia; Section 4.3 sum-
marises proposals made by Baruch Lev; Section
4.4 summarises proposals made by the Garten
Report (2001). Although this list may not be ex-
haustive (other groups and individuals have pro-
posed changes as well), I believe the proposals I
discuss cover the full range of policy ideas.
Section 4.5 provides my evaluation of these pro-
posals, although I also make specific comments in
each subsection.
4.1. Vision from the CEOs of the international
audit networks
In the latter part of 2006, the CEOs of the
world’s six largest accounting firms released a
document containing what they labelled as a vision
for the world’s global capital markets and econo-
my (DiPiazza et al., 2006: 16). This document con-
tains a number of ideas for reforms in financial
reporting, including reforms related to intangibles.
Because the discussion with respect to intangibles
is relatively brief, I include it here in its entirety:
[Claim] ‘The large discrepancies between the
‘book’ and ‘market’ values of many, if not most,
public companies … provide strong evidence of
the limited usefulness of statements of assets and
liabilities that are based on historical costs.
Clearly, a range of ‘intangibles’ that are not well
measured, or not measured at all, under current
accounting conventions are driving company
performance. Investors and other stakeholders in
business information want to know what those
intangibles are, and how they might plausibly 
affect how businesses perform in the future.’
(DiPiazza et al., 2006: 16).
[Proposal] ‘The information produced should be
forward-looking, even though it may be histori-
cal in fact. For example, the following measures
are all non-financial in character but are likely to
be predictive, to varying degrees, of how well a
company will perform in the future: innovative
success … measures of customer satisfaction,
product or service defects or awards, and meas-
ures of employee satisfaction (perhaps approxi-
mated by turnover).’ (DiPiazza et al., 2006: 17).
4.2. Scandinavian proposals
A number of proposals for reporting information
on intangibles have come out of projects initiated
by government and academics in Europe, and
specifically the Scandinavian countries. I consider
198 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 1
Inflation-adjusted capital expenditures (Capex), advertising expenditures, and R&D expenditures for
US public firms, 1980–2005
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two of these proposals – those from the Meritum
project (the Meritum Guidelines) and from the
Danish Government (Danish proposal).26 Both of
these proposals focus on intellectual capital and
develop suggested frameworks for providing in-
formation about knowledge resources. In addition,
both proposals envision the resulting ‘intellectual
capital reports’ as being used both internally for
purposes of managing an organisation’s intellectu-
al property and externally for reporting to in-
vestors and other stakeholders. In neither case is
there any suggested change to existing financial
reporting models, i.e. both propose supplementary
disclosure, and neither takes a position on whether
such disclosures should be mandated.
The Meritum Guidelines suggest that intellectu-
al capital has three main components – human cap-
ital (knowledge that employees take with them
when they leave the firm), structural capital
(knowledge that stays with the firms at the end of
the working day, such as organisational routines,
procedures, systems, cultures, databases, etc.), and
relational capital (resources linked to the external
relationships of the firm, with customers, suppli-
ers, etc.). The Danish proposal takes a similar ap-
proach, but indicates that knowledge resources are
of four major types, related to employees, cus-
tomers, processes, and technologies.
These two proposals are also similar in propos-
ing a framework that has a number of levels, each
beginning with the company’s overall strategic ob-
jectives. Identifying the organisation’s overall
strategic objectives allows it to identify its critical
intangibles, which in turn allows it to identify the
necessary intangible resources, which in turn al-
lows it to identify the necessary intangibles activi-
ties. The Meritum proposal thus suggests an
intellectual capital report with three components:
(1) the vision of the company, (2) a summary of in-
tangible resources and activities, and (3) a system
of indicators or measures. As an example of the
latter, the report suggests using ‘the ratio of the
number of PCs to the total number of employees’
if information technology is critical to achieving
the organisation’s objectives.
The Danish proposal suggests a similar type of
report but uses four levels: (1) a ‘knowledge nar-
rative’ that discusses the products and services that
the company provides, what ‘makes a difference’
for its customers, necessary knowledge resources,
and the relation between value and these re-
sources; (2) management challenges related to the
knowledge resources; (3) initiatives necessary to
secure and manage these resources; and (4) indica-
tors of success in developing and managing these
resources.
4.3. Baruch Lev’s proposals
Baruch Lev is an American accounting academ-
ic who is well-known for his views on financial re-
porting for intangibles, which are captured in his
2001 book (Lev, 2001). In his book, Lev (2001,
Ch. 5) proposes a ‘Value Chain Scorecard’ based
on what he calls the fundamental economic
process of innovation, which starts with the dis-
covery of new products or services, proceeds
through their development and the establishment
of technological feasibility, and culminates in their
commercialisation. He presents (his Fig. 5.1) nine
boxes, three in each of these areas:
• Discovery and learning:
• Internal renewal (e.g. R&D, workforce train-
ing and development).
• Acquired capabilities (e.g. technology pur-
chase, capital expenditures).
• Networking (e.g. R&D alliances and joint ven-
tures, supplier and customer integration).
• Implementation:
• IP (e.g. patents, copyrights, trademarks).
• Technological feasibility (e.g. clinical tests,
FDA approvals, beta tests).
• Internet (e.g. alliances, online purchases, traf-
fic).
• Commercialisation:
• Customers (e.g. brand values, online sales,
marketing alliances).
• Performance (e.g. knowledge earnings and as-
sets, innovation revenues).
• Growth prospects (e.g. product pipeline and
launch dates).
Lev indicates that not all of these nine categories
will be applicable to all firms. He further suggests
that specific indicators designed to measure 
these attributes be subject to three criteria: (i)
quantifiable measures, (ii) standardised measures
(comparability), and (iii) empirical testing to es-
tablish usefulness to users.
In many ways, this proposal is similar to those
summarised above, in that he is proposing a struc-
tured approach to organising the disclosure of in-
formation about intangibles. Although he does not
start with disclosures about the organisation’s
strategy and objectives, he nevertheless arrives at
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 199
26 See ‘Intellectual Capital Statements – the New
Guidelines’ published by the Danish Ministry of Science
Technology and Innovation (2003) and ‘Guidelines for
Managing and Reporting on Intangibles (Intellectual Capital
Report)’ a document produced by Meritum, a group of
European researchers brought together under the auspices of
the EU (report available at http://www.urjc.es/innotec/
tools/MERITUM%20Guidelines.pdf) (last accessed 8 October
2007).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:43
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
the same types of activity measures for reporting
to investors and other users.
4.4. The Garten Report (2001)
This report was originally commissioned in
October 1999 by Arthur Levitt, who was then
Chairman of the SEC. The Garten Report makes
two principal recommendations.
• That a new framework be created for supple-
mental reporting of intangible assets. The re-
port recommends that this work be done by the
SEC, but that no new reporting requirements be
mandated. Rather, the report suggests that
broad reporting principles for intangibles
should be established, that ‘Industry specific
reporting practices … should evolve naturally
as companies and investors gain experience’,
and that the framework ‘should not be a list of
prescribed measures that all companies must
report’.
• That regulators make the environment more con-
ducive to innovation in disclosure practices, in-
cluding consideration of safe harbour provisions
to protect managers against litigation.
4.5. Evaluation of these proposals
Although all these proposals may sound reason-
able in theory, I believe that there are at least sev-
eral practical/implementation concerns.27
First, many of the measures would be industry-
or firm-specific, and so not subject to standardisa-
tion or comparison (e.g. order backlogs for
Boeing).
Second, from a reporting and assurance perspec-
tive, many of these measures will be difficult to
verify in an objective way in part because they
often differ across firms and industries and are not
measured in a standardised way.
Third, proprietary costs of disclosure are likely
to be significant and will lead to preparer objec-
tions.28
For these reasons, I believe that such proposals
will be difficult to implement as mandated disclo-
sures and so are probably better understood as
guidelines for structuring voluntary disclosures.
Moreover, to the extent that investors find such
disclosures useful, market forces will provide
managers with incentives to disclose them if those
disclosures pass the cost-benefit test. For example,
in certain industries the voluntary disclosure of im-
portant metrics has naturally evolved:
• Automobile manufacturers disclose sales by
type of vehicle (cars, SUVs, light trucks, etc.) on
a monthly basis.
• Some companies and industries disclose infor-
mation on orders, order backlogs, etc., especial-
ly when they are in a business with relatively
small number of large and significant customers
(Boeing, Airbus, defence contractors).
• Many life insurers outside of the US provide
‘embedded value’ information which many ana-
lysts find more useful than the GAAP financial
statement numbers.29
• Advertising agencies provide detailed informa-
tion on employee costs (such as headcount, rev-
enue/headcount, often broken down by
geography and line of business) and organic
growth because these metrics are crucial to the
valuation of these entities by external investors
(for example, see disclosures by WPP Group and
Publicis Groupe).
• Oil and gas producers’ financial statements are
arguably not very good indicators of their busi-
ness activities, and so these entities typically dis-
close other types of information about their
exploration and production activities.
Consistent with this view, researchers have
found evidence that in particular industries compa-
nies disclose those metrics (outside of the financial
statements) that are useful to investors and that
those metrics provide information to investors. For
example, see Chandra et al. (1999) regarding dis-
closures made in the semiconductor industry or
Amir and Lev (1996) regarding the wireless com-
munication (mobile phone) industry.
Lev largely dismisses (2001: 120) the possibili-
ty that managers will voluntarily provide informa-
tion about intangibles. Lev argues that if
voluntary disclosure hasn’t solved the problem al-
ready, it’s unlikely to happen. Notice that this
view assumes that existing levels of voluntary dis-
closure are somehow ‘suboptimal’, a position
that, it seems to me, is hard to support with evi-
dence. As indicated above, we do have some vol-
untary disclosure of these types of metrics (the
quantity of disclosure is not zero), so against what
benchmark can we establish that this level is not
sufficient? The argument rests on the types of
claims discussed above in Section 2. As indicated
there, there is little in the way of convincing evi-
dence that the current system is failing us in any
important ways.
An additional problem with mandating disclo-
sure on intangibles is that it is likely to be very dif-
200 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
27 I am largely in agreement with the conclusions of the
Garten Report, in the sense that I do not support the idea of
mandating intangibles disclosure but instead favour taking
regulatory action that would encourage voluntary disclosure
by making it less costly.
28 Proprietary costs are costs associated with disclosing po-
tentially valuable information to the firm’s competitors.
29 See, for example, European Embedded Value Principles,
CFO Forum, available at http://www.cfoforum.nl/eev_
principles.pdf (last accessed 23 November 2007).
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ficult to standardise these disclosures in any mean-
ingful way.30 For example, even if we restrict at-
tention to one type of intangible – consider
customer satisfaction – it is unlikely that there are
either generally accepted measures of this variable
or that measures could be standardised across dif-
ferent companies, industries, and economies.
Customer satisfaction is likely to be very different
in the automobile industry (where quality and reli-
ability are likely to be important) than it is in the
fast food industry (where service times, conven-
ience, and pricing are likely to be most important).
This means that it will be difficult for standard-set-
ters to say anything very meaningful or specific
about disclosure.
Moreover, because any disclosure standard in
this area would have to be written at a high level
of generality (to encompass the large amount of
variation in the nature and measurement of intan-
gibles across industries), there is likely to be a
problem of whether such a rule would actually be
effective in encouraging disclosure. If the rule
lacks specificity, it will be relatively easy for com-
panies to make vague, uninformative disclosures if
they so choose. In an interesting recent paper,
Marquardt and Wiedman (2007) find that even
when the FASB issues guidance about appropriate
disclosures in a relatively specific way (in this case
with respect to the effect of contingently convert-
ible securities on reported EPS), there is still a sig-
nificant level of non-compliance, which leads me
to believe that high-level disclosure standards on
intangibles could be ineffective.31
Finally, it seems to me that a major shortcoming
of mandating disclosures in this area is to sensibly
weigh the benefits of disclosures against their
costs. Even if we could reach conclusions about
how to measure the benefits of disclosure (and I
would argue that we cannot) it would seem very
difficult for accounting rule-makers to assess the
costs of those disclosures. Moreover, these costs
are likely to vary considerably across different
firms and industries, depending on many factors.
For example, the largest category of costs is likely
to be proprietary costs, which are likely to vary
greatly depending on the competitive position of
different firms and industries. All of these issues
may explain why standard-setters’ current concep-
tual framework largely ignores disclosure, espe-
cially when not tied to recognition.
Some proponents of enhanced intangibles dis-
closures make strong claims about the likely bene-
fits of mandating disclosure. For example, Eccles
et al. (2001, Ch. 10) argue that enhanced disclo-
sure levels will likely lower firms’ cost of capital,
increase analyst following, and so forth. These au-
thors often cite academic work on voluntary dis-
closure (e.g. Botosan, 1997) in support of their
claims. However, they fail to appreciate that there
is a serious problem in drawing inferences about
mandatory disclosure from these types of stud-
ies.32 Specifically, these papers study firms’ volun-
tary disclosure choices. Presumably, managers of
firms that choose to make more forthcoming dis-
closures do so because these choices have net ben-
efits for their firms. It does not follow that these
same benefits would accrue to firms generally if
these same disclosures were mandated.
To see the problem with this logic, consider the
possibility that firms voluntarily make certain dis-
closures because the nature of their investment op-
portunities generates relatively large information
asymmetries, which increases their cost of capital.
For example, if managers of companies engaged in
the development of new drugs believe they are un-
dervalued because their financial statements do
not provide external investors with sufficient in-
formation about the value of their development ac-
tivities, managers of these firms could make
additional voluntary disclosures. These firms
would increase disclosure above the levels that are
mandated until the additional (marginal) costs of
disclosure equalled the associated marginal bene-
fits. It may well be that higher disclosure for these
firms results in a lower cost of capital. However,
for firms without such information asymmetries,
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30 This is very clear from Ittner’s (2008) paper on the use of
non-financial (intangible) measures for internal decision-mak-
ing purposes. As he emphasises, empirical research on the use
of non-financial measures reveals tremendous diversity across
firms in terms of the measures they choose to use and the way
that different measures are weighted across different organisa-
tions. This is a natural result of the fact that different busi-
nesses have different objectives and strategies. Moreover, he
reports that the link between non-financial measures and out-
come variables such as earnings and stock returns also varies
widely and seems to depend on differences in the underlying
structural relationships.
31 This is not to say that the existence of a disclosure rule in
this area would not increase the ability of auditors, audit com-
mittees, analysts, and other investors to pressure company
management into improving disclosures in this area; however,
my sense is that management was determined to avoid useful
disclosure in this area, a mandated disclosure rule may not
help very much. Consider the recent US experience after the
introduction of SFAS 131, which has caused firms to improve
their segment disclosures. Similar to intangibles, segment dis-
closure is an area where there is likely to be considerable vari-
ation across firms and industries as to the way businesses
operate and so in the way segments are structured as well as
claims that proprietary costs are significant. Nevertheless, the
‘management approach’ (which requires that firms report seg-
ment data in a manner consistent with internal reporting)
adopted in SFAS 131 seems to have been successful in im-
proving disclosure. To the extent that intangibles are important
drivers of value for companies, we would expect them to have
developed internal information systems to manage those in-
tangibles. Thus, along the lines of the management approach,
standard-setters could encourage or require firms to report
those intangibles measures used internally for management
purposes to external constituents.
32 I am assuming that the results in these studies are not sub-
ject to questions about their reliability.
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such disclosures may well be suboptimal – the fact
that these firms choose not to make these addition-
al disclosures is, to a first approximation, evidence
that the marginal costs of such disclosures exceed
the corresponding benefits.
In short then, it is very difficult to draw infer-
ences from empirical work on voluntary disclosure
about the likely costs and benefits of mandated
disclosures. Moreover, to the extent that disclo-
sures have net benefits, firms themselves have in-
centives to voluntarily provide such disclosures
with regulatory intervention.
5. Why recognition of intangibles will not
work
With respect to disclosure, Lev (2001) recognises
the fact (see also Schipper (2007)) that the con-
ceptual frameworks established by accounting
standard-setters largely do not address disclosure
issues, except in passing and rather superficially;
these frameworks principally address issues relat-
ed to the recognition of items in the financial state-
ments. This means that standard-setters would
have little conceptual basis for even thinking about
disclosure outside of the financial statements
themselves.33
Consequently, Lev advocates that the large ac-
counting firms, along with accounting and securi-
ties regulators, jointly develop a disclosure
framework (‘Information Structure’) that would
standardise disclosure and so ‘initiate the revela-
tion process’ (p. 122), encouraging voluntary dis-
closure of information about intangibles. Once this
disclosure system has been established, he then ad-
vocates changing the accounting system. His prin-
cipal recommendation here is to broaden the
recognition criterion so that expenditures on intan-
gibles can be recognised as assets to a greater ex-
tent. This would be accomplished by relaxing the
criteria on reliability (probable future benefits) and
control (that the entity has control over the asset).
More specifically, Lev advocates a successful ef-
forts/technological feasibility approach similar to
that currently used in IAS 38 or SFAS 86, but more
generally applied and implemented differently, in
the sense that once technological feasibility is es-
tablished, the entity would go back and capitalise
past as well as current/future expenditures on the
project. I have a number of concerns about this 
approach.
First, this approach (capitalising expenditures
from past periods that were initially expensed)
would seem likely to compromise the consistency
of the financial statement numbers – if the value
chain is long, spanning several accounting periods,
this approach would involve frequent revisions in
previously reported numbers, potentially reducing
user confidence in the reliability of the numbers.
Second, relaxed asset recognition criteria would
likely open the door further for earnings manage-
ment/manipulation, a point that Lev recognises.
Lev’s answer is to provide sufficient (presumably
footnote) disclosure so that the accounting is trans-
parent, which then allows users to ‘undo’ any ac-
counting decisions that they found questionable.
This raises the question of why recognition matters
so much if that recognition is to be linked to foot-
note disclosure. As we know all too well from the
debate over accounting for employee stock op-
tions, preparers and users of financial statements
place greater weight on numbers recognised in the
financial statements themselves than on otherwise
similar footnote disclosures, although we don’t
fully understand why this is the case.34 Thus, it is
not clear that footnote disclosure will fully address
the concern that managers would take advantage
of these types of intangibles to manipulate the
numbers reported in the financial statements.
One curious feature of the argument that we
should relax recognition rules to allow recognition
of a greater range of intangible assets is that the
prescription is asymmetric – those such as Lev
who make the argument that recognition rules for
assets should be relaxed do not consider the possi-
bility that, for symmetry, we should also consider
relaxing recognition rules for liabilities in a corre-
sponding way. This may bring some unintended
consequences – if we begin to recognise liabilities
for which the future sacrifice of resources is more
uncertain than is currently the case, it is not clear
that the ‘problem’ of high market-to-book ratios
would ultimately be solved.35 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that expenditures on intangibles are financed
in different ways to tangible assets (for example,
through joint venture or other types of off-balance-
sheet arrangements), relaxed recognition criteria
could result in a large change in both sides of cor-
porate balance sheets.
Another practical issue here is whether these re-
laxed recognition criteria would also apply to other
(tangible) asset categories or, indeed, more gener-
ally to recognition and derecognition in financial
reporting. If so, the implications for financial re-
porting are far-reaching.
Most types of intangibles, at least under the
broad definition discussed above, tend to have dif-
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33 Although notice that accounting standards do require qual-
itative disclosures in certain areas, for example, in the area of
contingent liabilities – although some may argue that these dis-
closures are not very informative since they are often ‘boiler-
plate’ disclosures that fail to provide meaningful information.
34 The other obvious case in point here is the treatment of
capital versus operating leases. Although footnote disclosures
related to operating leases are of a high quality, managers still
invest economic resources to avoid balance sheet recognition
(Imhoff and Thomas, 1988).
35 Consider also that a more liberal definition of liabilities
would open the door for earnings management through the use
of ‘hidden reserves’ of earnings.
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ferent economic characteristics to those assets
recognised under current accounting rules.36 These
characteristics include:
a. Many intangibles are not separate, saleable, or
discrete items. As such, their value is intrinsi-
cally tied to the residual value of the firm.
Examples of assets in these categories are cus-
tomer satisfaction, employee loyalty, certain
brand names, and so on. These resources in-
crease in value as the result of many different
and interrelated activities and expenditures,
making it hard to uniquely identify the costs
associated with these assets.
b. The well-defined property rights associated
with most tangible and financial resources cur-
rently recognised as assets often do not extend
to intangibles. For example, it is often very
difficult to exclude others from enjoying the
benefits associated with these resources.
c. Largely because of these characteristics, there
are no liquid secondary markets for many in-
tangibles, making it difficult to reliably meas-
ure the value of these resources. This means
that it will be difficult to reliably estimate fair
values for these types of resources.
d. Because many intangibles are not separable
and saleable, and because of poorly defined
property rights, it is often difficult to write
fully-specified contracts for intangibles.
These characteristics make it difficult for many in-
tangibles to be recognised as assets under the current
accounting model. Moreover, it is difficult to see
how accounting rules could be modified in such a
way as to allow such resources to be recognised as
assets without changing the overall accounting
model in important ways. The main reason relates to
the non-separability issue – without being able to
separately identify the costs or value attributable to
each of these resources, it is not possible to reliably
measure either their cost or their fair value. In addi-
tion, if the future benefits associated with these as-
sets are both uncertain (for example, because of the
property rights issues) and inherently connected to
the benefits attributable to the entity as a whole, it is
not clear that we could even identify individual as-
sets to recognise. For example, future sales growth
and profit margins are likely related to past expendi-
tures on marketing, advertising, employee training
and retention programs, product quality programs,
and other expenditures that attract and sustain cus-
tomer interest in the entity’s products. It would be
hard to attribute these benefits to separate assets such
as customer satisfaction, employee loyalty, and so on.
6. Conclusions
Proposals for reforming accounting and disclosure
practices in the intangibles area have been around
for at least 15 years (dating at least to the origins
of the Jenkins Committee) and accounting stan-
dard-setters have devoted considerable resources
to this area. However, little actual progress has
been made in terms of generating new accounting
rules. I do not find this surprising. A close exami-
nation of claims made by those who advocate re-
form indicates that there is little evidence to
support the notion that the current system has
caused any serious problems for entities seeking to
finance innovative, high-technology projects. In
fact, I argue that financial markets work very well
to finance these types of investments, although the
way in which they are financed is naturally differ-
ent from how tangible assets such as factories are
financed. Moreover, I argue that proposals to man-
date additional disclosure in the intangibles area
are likely to be unsuccessful because of the fact
that the nature and measurement of intangibles
varies considerably across industries as well as for
other reasons. I also argue that proposals to expand
existing asset recognition criteria to include intan-
gibles currently excluded from balance sheets are
problematic in a number of respects. In the end,
my view is that we need to rely on private incen-
tives to encourage disclosure of information relat-
ed to the management and valuation of intangibles,
although regulators can help in this area by pro-
viding guidance about the forms that disclosure
might take and by minimising any costs of disclo-
sure, including legal costs.
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